

the honor of the Senate. It is about the traditions of the Senate. It is about a signal we will send if we allow this deadlock to continue.

Mr. President, I will not take any more of the Senate's time on this matter. There will be much more to say on it. I will at this time yield my time to the Senator from Rhode Island if he wishes to take advantage of the little extra time.

I yield the floor.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator very much.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

#### IN DEFENSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I wish to take a moment to outline some of the concerns I have about the provisions pertaining to the United Nations in the bill we have been considering, the State authorization bill.

Titles II and III of the bill, in my opinion, amount collectively to an assault on U.S. participation in the U.N. system. I know that some Americans have questioned the effectiveness of the United Nations in certain peacekeeping operations, such as those in Somalia and Bosnia, and that there are lingering concerns about the ability of the United States to expend resources on foreign affairs in general.

That being said, I think it is fair to say there is evidence that a majority of Americans support U.S. participation in the U.N. system—particularly when it comes to U.N. peacekeeping. To paraphrase former Secretary of State James Baker, U.N. peacekeeping is a pretty good bargain. For every dollar the United States spends on U.N. peacekeeping, we save many more by preventing conflicts in which we would otherwise become involved unilaterally.

I am therefore distraught and distressed by this bill's obvious anti-U.N. course. If adopted in its present form, this bill could well establish the foundation for an eventual U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. system. I think that would be a disastrous outcome, and one to which the American public would strenuously object. As Secretary of State Christopher noted in a recent letter to me, " \* \* \* turning our back on the U.N. would increase the economic, political, and military burden on the American people."

There are a number of troublesome sections in this bill relating to the United Nations. Section 201 authorizes a reduction of more than \$157 million from the President's request for the U.S. assessed contributions to the United Nations and related agencies. From there, the fiscal year 1997-99 recommendations are straightlined—frozen, to be precise—at the fiscal year 1996 levels.

That is a mistake. If we enact this provision, the Congress will force the United States to default on treaty obli-

gations and fall further into arrears on our payments to the United Nations. I remember how hard I tried to work with the Bush administration to bring the United States back from its default status at the United Nations; what a shame it would be for us to fall behind once more.

Section 203, in a misguided effort to save the United States money at the United Nations, calls for the U.N. General Assembly to reformulate the percentages of assessed contributions, and to base those percentages upon each nation's share of the world's total gross national product. If we were to follow these guidelines, however, the U.S. share of total assessed contributions to the United Nations would easily exceed our current mandated ceiling of 25 percent. In other words, we would achieve the exact opposite of what this section probably intends.

Section 205 is probably the most problematic of all the U.N. provisions. This section would have the United States withhold 50 percent of its assessed peacekeeping dues and 20 percent of its regular contributions, and would bar payment of all voluntary peacekeeping contributions, unless the President were able to certify certain conditions with regard to the U.N. inspector general's office.

While U.N. reform is a good idea, this provision sets unworkable standards for an effective U.N. inspector general. In other words, the President would never be able to certify the conditions set forth in this legislation, nor in many cases would he want such conditions to arise. In my opinion, by setting such impossible certification requirements, this section is but a thinly veiled attempt to cut off enormous percentages of U.S. funding for the United Nations. It ought to be modified or, better yet, deleted.

There are other sections that also should be revised. I know that Senator KERRY and I have had discussions with our Republican counterparts to express concerns about section 206, a so-called whistle-blower provision; section 212, which increases advance notification requirement for U.N. Security Council votes; section 217, which creates exceptions for U.S. enforcement of U.N. sanctions regimes; section 220, which redefines the U.S. concept of a peacekeeping operation; and finally, sections 313, 316, and 317, which would prohibit certain U.S. contributions to the ILO and other international organizations.

Having returned just a short time ago from the 50th anniversary celebration of the foundation of the United Nations, I am convinced more than ever of the usefulness and necessity of U.S. participation in the United Nations. It is often repeated—and with good reason—that if the United Nations did not exist, then the world would need to invent it. I think it is high time that the Congress recognized the good and positive value we get for spending at the United Nations, and

make the correct decision to reject the troublesome provisions in this bill.

Mr. President, on July 28, former Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, who is now Chair of the U.N. Association, wrote to me to outline the Association's assessment of the U.S. stake in the United Nations. It is an important statement and offers a clear and concise argument for continued U.S. participation in the United Nations.

Secretary Whitehead's letter prompted me to recall my own personal involvement with the United Nations having been present at its creation. To be precise, I was an Assistant Secretary of Committee III—the Enforcement Arrangements Committee—and worked specifically on what became articles 43, 44, and 45 of the charter. These articles are as relevant now as they were 50 years ago.

To my mind, the charter has been more than mere words and paper, more than a blueprint of an organizational structure. To me, the charter is a vibrant and dynamic force, willed into being by the collective hopes and dreams of the participants in the San Francisco conference. Although experience has proven that the charter has not always lived up to such high expectations, the last 50 years have proven that collective security is a pretty sound concept for relations between states. It therefore pains me to see this debate in Congress over the future of U.S. participation in the U.N. system.

If the United States abandons the United Nations, the United Nations could well meet the same fate as the League of Nations. I think our interest lies in remaining solidly behind the United Nations. The U.S. failure to support the League of Nations is precisely why the League failed. We should not let the same thing happen to the United Nations. In the coming years, I can easily foresee that the United States will need the United Nations to intervene in areas of conflict or to tackle issues such as the international environment, world hunger, and refugee crises.

It is unfair and shortsighted to judge the United Nations solely on its success or failure in dealing with an intractable, longstanding ethnic conflict such as that in the former Yugoslavia. Rather, we should look at its 50 year's worth of experience in promoting collective security, humanitarian assistance and international cooperation in the environment and other areas.

The record, I would argue, has been good, and with a little work, the future holds real promise. My hope is that 50 years from now, when the United Nations celebrates its 100 year anniversary, our children will look back and remember this time as the turning point.

I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Whitehead's letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.N. ASSOCIATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
New York, NY, July 26, 1995.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,  
*Senate Russell Office Building,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR SENATOR PELL: I am writing to share with you a policy statement of the United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA) on the U.S. stake in the United Nations and U.N. financing, adopted in late June by UNA-USA's national convention on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter.

It is a serious yet succinct statement on an issue of considerable importance, with major implications for the Congress. We hope you will find it of interest. UNA-USA is eager to make a constructive contribution to the policy debate.

We would be pleased to share any reactions with UNA-USA's 25,000 members.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. WHITEHEAD,  
*Chairman of the Association.*

Enclosure.

#### FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS

The greatest threat today to the U.N.'s effectiveness and even survival is the cancer of financial insolvency. Countries slow to pay their share include many that are small. But it is the massive delinquencies of the United States that have plunged the Organization into chronic crisis and sapped its capacity to respond to emergencies and new needs.

The services provided by international organizations are, objectively, quite cheap—especially in comparison with the sums we spend on other dimensions of national security, such as the military, as backup in the event that diplomacy and the U.N. machinery fail. The annual U.S. assessments for peacekeeping worldwide are less than the police budget for the nation's largest city. Total American contributions, voluntary as well as obligatory, for all agencies of the U.N. system amount to \$7 per capita (compared to some \$1,000 per capita for the Defense Department).

Some object that U.N. peacekeeping costs have exploded over the past decade, from a U.S. share of \$53 million in 1985 to \$1.08 billion projected for 1995. But the end of the Cold War that sparked that increase, by freeing the U.N. to be an effective agent of conflict management, also allowed for far larger reductions in other U.S. security spending: Over the same decade, Pentagon budgets have fallen \$34 billion. Increased reliance on U.N. collective security operations necessarily complements our defense savings. Moreover, U.N. costs are spread among all member states, and constitute a truly cost-effective bargain for all.

However, at a time of hard budget choices, many national politicians see U.N. contributions as an easy target. They are misguided. In asserting that national parliaments can unilaterally set their nations' assessment levels, claim offsets from assessed obligations for voluntary peacekeeping contributions, and impose policy conditions for payment of their agreed share of expenses, some Washington politicians jeopardize the institutional underpinnings of the world community. No multilateral organization—whether the U.N., the World Bank, or NATO—can long survive if member states play by such rules.

In ratifying the U.N. Charter, every member state assented in law to the financial obligations of U.N. membership. Virtually all of America's allies in the industrialized world fulfill those obligations to the United Nations—in full, on time, and without conditions. Until relatively recently, so did the United States. It must do so again.

America's leaders must recommit this nation to full and timely payment of assessed contributions to the U.N. and related organizations, including prompt retirement of arrears accumulated over the past decade. Financial unreliability leaves our institutions of common purpose vulnerable and inefficient. We must sustain—and, where needed, increase—our voluntary financial support of the U.N. system's many vital activities in the economic and social fields as well as peace and security. We should press for assessment scales that fairly reflect nations' relative capacity to pay, and explore other means, including minimal fees on international transactions of appropriate types, to ensure that funds to pay for the U.N. system budgets that member states approve do, in fact, materialize.

#### AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Fifty years ago we, the people of the United States, joined in common purpose and shared commitment with the people of 50 other nations. The most catastrophic war in history had convinced nations that no country could any longer be safe and secure in isolation. From this realization was born the United Nations—the idea of a genuine world community and a framework for solving human problems that transcend national boundaries. Since then, technology and economics have transformed “world community” from a phrase to a fact, and if the World War II generation had not already established the U.N. system, today's would have to create it.

The founders of the United Nations were clairvoyant in many ways. The Charter anticipated decolonization; called for “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”; and set up the institutional framework “for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.” In meeting the Charter's challenges, we make for a more secure and prosperous world.

Through the U.N. system, many serious conflicts have been contained or concluded. Diseases have been controlled or eradicated, children immunized, refugees protected and fed. Nations have set standards on issues of common concern—ranging from human rights to environmental survival to radio frequencies. Collective action has also furthered particular U.S. government interests, such as averting a widening war in the Middle East into which Washington might otherwise be drawn. After half a century, the U.N. remains a unique investment yielding multiple dividends for Americans and others alike.

The U.N.'s mandate to preserve peace and security was long hobbled by the Cold War, whose end has allowed the institutions of global security to spring to life. The five permanent members of the Security Council now meet and function as a cohesive group, and what the Council has lost in rhetorical drama it has more than gained in forging common policies. Starting with the Reagan Administration's effort to marshal the Security Council to help bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, every U.S. administration has turned to the U.N. for collective action to help maintain or restore peace. Common policy may not always result in success, but neither does unilateral policy—and, unlike unilateral intervention, it spreads costs and risks widely and may help avoid policy disasters.

Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War has also given rise in the U.S. to a resurgent isolationism, along with calls for unilateral, go-it-alone policies. Developments in many places that once would have stirred alarm

are now viewed with indifference. When they do excite American political interest, the impulse is often to respond unilaterally in the conviction that only Washington can do the job and do it right. Without a Soviet threat, some Americans imagine we can renounce “foreign entanglements.” Growing hostility to U.N. peacekeeping in some political circles reflects, in large measure, the shortsighted idea that America has little at stake in the maintenance of a peaceful world. In some quarters, resentment smolders at any hint of reciprocal obligations; but in a country founded on the rule of law, the notion that law should rule among nations ought not to be controversial.

The political impulse to go it alone surges at precisely the moment when nations have become deeply interconnected. The need for international teamwork has never been clearer. Goods, capital, news, entertainment, and ideas flow across national borders with astonishing speed. So do refugees, diseases, drugs, environmental degradation, terrorists, and currency crashes.

The institutions of the U.N. system are not perfect, but they remain our best tools for concerted international action. Just as Americans often seek to reform our own government, we must press for improvement of the U.N. system. Fragmented and of limited power, prone to political paralysis, bureaucratic torpor, and opaque accountability, the U.N. system requires reform—but not wrecking. Governments and citizens must press for changes that improve agencies' efficiency, enhance their responsiveness, and make them accountable to the world's publics they were created to serve. Our world institutions can only be strengthened with the informed engagement of national leaders, press, and the public at large.

The American people have not lost their commitment to the United Nations and to the rule of law. They reaffirm it consistently, whether in opinion surveys or UNICEF campaigns. Recognizing the public's sentiment, the foes of America's U.N. commitment—unilateralists, isolationists, or whatever—do not call openly for rejecting the U.N. as they had earlier rejected outright the League of Nations. But the systematic paring back of our commitment to international law and participation in institutions would have the same effect.

In this 50th anniversary year, America's leaders should rededicate the nation to the promise of a more peaceful and prosperous world contained in the U.N. Charter. In that spirit, the United Nations Association of the United States calls on the people and government of the United States, and those of all other U.N. member states, to join in strengthening the United Nations system for the 21st century:

In particular, we call for action in five areas, which will be the top policy priorities of UNA-USA as we enter the U.N.'s second half-century:

Reliable financing of the United Nations system.

Strong and effective U.N. machinery to help keep the peace.

Promotion of broad-based and sustainable world economic growth.

Vigorous defense of human rights and protection of displaced populations.

Control, reduction, or elimination of highly destructive weaponry.

I yield the floor.

RECESS UNTIL 9:30 A.M.  
TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 9:30 a.m., August 1, 1995.